We de…ne feasible, posterior individually rational solutions for twoperson Bayesian games with a single informed player. Such a solution can be achieved by direct signalling from the informed player and requires approval of both players after the signal has been sent. Without further assumptions on the Bayesian game, a solution does not necessarily exist. We show that, if the uninformed player has a "uniform punishment strategy"against the informed one, the existence of a solution follows from the existence of Nash equilibrium in in…nitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. We consider the extension of the result when both players have private information.
Introduction
The classical folk theorem states that the set of Nash equilibrium payo¤s of an undiscounted in…nitely repeated game with complete information coincides with the set of feasible and individually rational payo¤s of the one-shot game. As emphasized in Myerson (1991) , Kalai et al. (2010) and Tennenholtz (2004) , the latter set describes meaningful solutions for one-shot games with commitment, namely, cooperative solutions of the one-shot game. In this paper, we investigate the possible relationship between noncooperative solutions of the in…nitely repeated game and cooperative solutions of the one-shot game when information is incomplete.
We mostly consider a two-person Bayesian game with a single informed player. In such a model, feasibility and individual rationality can take various forms. We introduce feasible, posterior individually rational solutions, which can be achieved by direct signalling from the informed player (i.e., by cheap talk, without the help of a mediator) and are approved by both players after the informed player has sent his signal (i.e., given the posterior belief of the uninformed player). This set is smaller than the set of mediated, incentive compatible, interim individually rational solutions of Myerson (1991) , which is always nonempty.
Without further assumptions on the Bayesian game, we show that a feasible, posterior individually rational solution (which will just be referred to as a "solution"when there is no confusion) does not necessarily exist. If the informed player has no decision to make, the problem reduces to a senderreceiver game and there always exists a nonrevealing solution. If the uninformed player knows his own payo¤ (private values), then there always exists a completely revealing solution. We propose another, more interesting, assumption that guarantees the existence of a solution: the uninformed player has a "uniform punishment strategy"(UPS) against the informed one, namely, the uninformed player has a strategy that keeps the informed player at his type-dependent individually rational level, whatever his type. In this case, we show on an example that there may be only partially revealing solutions.
The existence of a feasible, posterior individually rational solution under UPS can be deduced from the existence of a Nash equilibrium in every twoperson undiscounted in…nitely repeated game with lack of information on one side. This class of games was introduced by Stearns (1968, 1995) who identi…ed a particular kind of Nash equilibrium, the joint plan equilibrium, in which there is a single phase of information transmission from the informed player to the uninformed one. Simon et al. (1995) established the existence of a joint plan equilibrium by making use of sophisticated mathematical tools. Sorin (1983) …rst proved the result under the assumption that the informed player has two possible types. In the case of private values, the existence of a completely revealing Nash equilibrium is straightforward, as shown by Shalev (1994) (see Forges (1992) , Hart (1985) , Renault (2000) , Simon (2002) and Simon et al. (2008) for further results on nonzero sum repeated games with incomplete information).
We can interpret our result as an extension of the folk theorem to twoperson games with a single informed player: under UPS, a set of noncooperative solutions of the in…nitely repeated game (i.e., the joint plan equilibrium payo¤s) coincides with a set of feasible, individually rational solutions of the one-shot game (feasibility being understood without a mediator and individual rationality being understood a posteriori). However, when the UPS assumption does not hold, such solutions may not exist in the one-shot game, while joint plan equilibria always exist in the in…nitely repeated one.
There is a large literature on cooperative solutions to Bayesian games and we will not try to survey it here. The main di¤erences between the present paper and others is that we consider situations in which (i) the informed player(s) can only transmit information by cheap talk (ii) both players can decline participation at the very last stage of the contracting process, i.e., after information has been transmitted.
In Myerson (1991)'s approach, individual rationality is formulated at the interim stage, i.e., before mediated information transmission, but further properties are imposed, e.g., appropriate forms of Pareto e¢ ciency. Peters and Celik (2011) and Peters and Szentes (2012) extend Bayesian games by means of speci…c (noncooperative) negotiation schemes, in which the players simultaneously exchange information and partially commit; posterior individual rationality need not hold. A. Kalai and E. Kalai (2013) propose the cooperative "coco" solution, which, under suitable assumptions, can be implemented by direct information transmission, with participation constraints at the ex ante or interim stage. The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we de…ne feasible, posterior individually rational solutions; in section 3, we address the question of the existence of posterior individually rational solutions in two-person Bayesian games and we show that UPS guarantees it by making the connection with in…nitely repeated games; in section 4, we propose further elements of comparison between the one-shot game and the repeated game and we consider the possible extension of our results to two-person Bayesian games in which both players have private information.
2 Individually rational solutions in Bayesian games with a single informed player
Basic framework and feasible solutions
Our basic framework is a two-person Bayesian game in which only player 1 has private (nonveri…able) information. Let K be a …nite set. A type k is chosen in K according to p 2 (K) at a virtual initial stage of the game and only player 1 is informed of k.
1 Unless speci…ed otherwise, we assume that p k > 0 for every k 2 K. Player 1 and player 2 choose simultaneously an action in …nite sets A 1 and A 2 respectively. If the pair of actions a 2 A = A 1 A 2 is chosen, they get the respective payo¤s U k (a) and V k (a). We refer to this game as B(p).
We are going to de…ne a solution for B(p), which will be cooperative in the sense that it speci…es a binding agreement between the players. 2 A solution is described by a …nite set S of signals, a signalling strategy : K ! (S) for the informed player and a joint decision function : S ! (A), which associates a correlated strategy (s) = x s 2 (A) with every signal s 2 S. The interpretation is that after player 1 has sent the signal s, actions are chosen in A on behalf of the players, according to the lottery x s .
The description of a solution in terms of mappings and incorporates basic feasibility conditions. Meaningful feasibility also requires that the informed player's signalling strategy be incentive compatible. For every k 2 K, let (k) = ( j k) be the probability distribution over S associated with the signalling strategy . Together with the prior probability p over K, induces the probability distribution (p )(s) =
be the posterior probability induced by p and over K; p s is well-de…ned as soon as (p )(s) > 0, i.e., given our assumption that p k > 0 for every k 2 K, as soon as 9k : (s j k) > 0. By restricting S, we can assume that (p )(s) > 0 for every s 2 S. We still use the notation U k and V k to denote the extension of the payo¤ functions to (A).
The signalling strategy :
Conditions i) and ii) take into account that player 1 sends a random signal by himself, without the help of a mediator; hence he randomizes over signals s; s 0 2 S if and only if he is indi¤erent between s and s 0 . Incentive compatibility implies in particular that for all types k, all signals s sent by type k (i.e., such that (s j k) > 0) lead to the same payo¤. Let us set u
The payo¤ u k is the …nal interim expected payo¤ of player 1 when his type is k and it coincides with his posterior payo¤, given s, for every relevant s.
Individual rationality
We will require that, in addition to being feasible, a solution be acceptable, namely, individually rational, for both parties. This means that each player should get at least what he can guarantee to himself by playing the original one-shot Bayesian game without cooperating. This motivates the following de…nitions of individual rationality. For player 1, the vector payo¤ matters so that the de…nition does not depend on the underlying probability distribution over K.
is (interim) individually rational for player 1 in B( ) if player 2 has a strategy in B( ) that prevents player 1 from getting more than u k when his type is k, namely
5
This de…nition reduces to u min
in the case of complete information, namely, when j K j= 1.
In a similar way, De…nition 2 Let q 2 (K). A payo¤ v is individually rational for player 2 in B(q) if player 1 has a strategy in B(q) that prevents player 2 from getting more than v, namely
Individual rationality can be de…ned in an equivalent but more tractable way. 3 Let, for every q 2 (K),
f 1 (q) is the value of the one-shot zero-sum Bayesian game 1 (q) in which player 1's type k is chosen according to q and payo¤s are de…ned by U k for player 1 and U k for player 2. 4 Of course, player 1 can make use of his private information in 1 (q). As a minimum of linear functions (of q), f 1 is concave over (K).
where f 1 de…ned by (4).
Proof: We …rst observe that (2) is equivalent to
where
On the other hand, from the de…nition of f 1 ,
Using that ' k ( ) is convex for every k, one shows that (6), (7), either by using a separation argument (see Sorin (2002) , proposition 2.7) or by using Sion's minmax theorem on an auxiliary game:
According to the new formulation (5), a vector payo¤ u is individually rational for player 1 if the hyperplane de…ned by u, namely q u, is above f 1 over the whole simplex (K). This property is much stronger than individual rationality at every type. Let us denote as k the k th extreme point of (K) (i.e., k k = 1, k = 0 for`6 = k) and let us set
A payo¤ u k is individually rational for every type k if u k u k (i.e., assuming complete information of type k). If u is individually rational for player 1, then for every k 2 K, u k u k . But the reverse is not true: the hyperplane de…ned by the vector u = (u k ) k2K might not be above f 1 , although u k f 1 ( k ) for every k (see the example in section 3.1 below).
Let us proceed in a similar way for player 2. Let g 1 (q) be the value of the one-shot 5 zero-sum Bayesian game 2 (q) in which player 1's type k is chosen according to q, player 1 can make use of his information and payo¤s are de…ned by V k for player 1 and V k for player 2, namely, for every q 2 (K),
As a maximum of linear functions (of q), g 1 is convex over (K). The next result is immediate:
, where g 1 is de…ned by (9).
Feasible, posterior individually rational solutions
We are now ready to de…ne a solution for B(p). Henceforth, we refer to a triple (S; ; ) satisfying de…nition 5 as a "feasible, posterior individually rational solution"or simply as a "solution". For player 2, individual rationality is indeed readily stated in terms of the posterior probability distribution given every signal. This participation condition is appropriate if player 2 does not fully commit himself before observing the type dependent signal of player 1. For the latter player, standard interim individually rational is required but, given the strong incentive compatibility conditions, the interim expected payo¤ u k and the posterior payo¤ U k (x s ) coincide as soon as the latter payo¤ is relevant (namely, as soon as (s j k) > 0).
The next lemma states that every solution can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game, in which player 1 sends a signal and then both players agree on a joint decision, conditionally on the signal. This implementation procedure o¤ers a justi…cation for the previous formulation of feasibility (involving incentive compatibility) and individual rationality.
Given the basic game B(p), a set of signals S and a joint decision function : S ! (A), let G(p; S; ) be the noncooperative game described as follows:
-Player 1's type k is chosen in K according to p, only player 1 is informed of k.
-Player 1 sends a signal s 2 S to player 2.
-The correlated strategy (s) = x s 2 (A) is proposed to both players.
-The players simultaneously accept or reject the correlated strategy x s .
-If both players accept x s , player 1 gets U k (x s ) and player 2 gets V k (x s ).
-If at least one of the players rejects x s , player 1 chooses a 1 , player 2 chooses a 2 , player 1 gets U k (a 1 ; a 2 ) and player 2 gets V k (a 1 ; a 2 ).
Lemma 6 Let B(p) be a two-person Bayesian game with a single informed player. (S; ; ) de…nes a solution for B(p) if and only if G(p; S; ) has an equilibrium in which player 1 sends his signal according to and both players always accept the correlated strategy that is proposed to them.
Proof: To complete the description of strategies in G(p; S; ) in which player 1's signalling strategy is and both players always accept the correlated strategy, let player 1's decision strategy be : K S ! (A 1 ) in case of rejection and let player 2's decision strategy : S ! (A 2 ) in case of rejection.
Let us set
Player 1's equilibrium conditions are, for every type k:
Indeed, player 1 can consider any signal s 0 , and, having sent s 0 , can accept or reject x s 0 ; in the latter case, player 1 cannot do better than best replying to (s 0 ). Player 1's equilibrium conditions are thus equivalent to incentive compatibility (as de…ned by i) and ii)) together with
where u = (u k ) k2K is de…ned by (1) . Let us check that u satis…es (10) if and only if u is individually rational in the sense of de…nition 1.
Assume that u satis…es (10). For every s, y s = (y k s ) s2S is individually rational in the sense of de…nition 1 (which is satis…ed with = (s)). Hence, u y s is also individually rational in the sense of de…nition 1.
Conversely, if u is individually rational in the sense of de…nition 1, there is a strategy of player 2 for which this de…nition is satis…ed. Let (s) = for every s; then y
Let us come to player 2's equilibrium conditions. Given the signal s, he updates his probability distribution over K to (p 
This is equivalent to
is individually rational for player 2 in B(p s ), in the sense of de…nition 2.
Even if every solution can be seen as a Nash equilibrium of some game, this equilibrium is a quite demanding one and we should not expect standard existence theorems to apply. We will turn to the existence issue in the next section. Before that, we recall a standard approach to feasibility and individual rationality, which is quite di¤erent from the previous one.
Mediated interim individually rational solutions
In the game G(p; S; ), the players only rely on a device (namely, ) to perform the lottery over joint actions conditionally on the informed player's signal but do not use any device to communicate. In other words, player 1 has to send his signal by himself (by means of ). Moreover, player 1 can only make use of his private information in the …nal decision by sharing it with player 2.
Myerson (1991, chapter 6, specially section 6.6) considers mediated solutions, in which player 1 is invited to report his information k to a mediator, who directly chooses a joint decision in (A) on behalf of the players. 7 The mediator's strategy can thus be described as a device : K ! (A). Incentive compatibility just says that player 1 cannot bene…t from lying to the mediator, namely
At a mediated solution, both players accept the help of the mediator at the interim stage, namely, before the mediator implements the device . Myerson (1991) thus requires that player 1's interim expected payo¤ U k ( (k)) k2K be individually rational according to de…nition 1 (namely, satis…es (5)) and player 2's expected payo¤ be individually rational according to de…nition 2. (A) such that is incentive compatible, player 1's interim expected payo¤ is individually rational and player 2's expected payo¤
R denotes the set of all interim expected payo¤s that can be achieved by a mediated solution in B(p).
M [B(p)] contains the set of Nash interim expected equilibrium payo¤s of B(p) and is thus not empty. 8 By proceeding as in the revelation principle (see Myerson (1991) ), one can show that C [B(p)] M [B(p)], i.e., payo¤s to unmediated posterior individually rational solutions can be achieved with the help of a mediator. Forges (2013) shows that M [B(p)] can be interpreted as the set all Nash equilibrium payo¤s that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage, a result that was established by Kalai et al. (2010) in the case of complete information. Let us …rst show that, even without taking account of player 2's payo¤s, there cannot be any nonrevealing joint decision that is individually rational for player 1. Indeed, any distribution over A = fT; Bg fL; Rg gives a sum of expected payo¤s u 1 + u 2 2 to player 1. If the original Bayesian game is played noncooperatively, player 2 plays L with some probability . By playing T when k = 1 and B when k = 2, player 1 gets + 2(1 ) when k = 1 and 2 + (1 ) when k = 2 and the sum of his expected payo¤s is 3. Similarly, if player 1 sends a signal s that leads to an interior posterior probability distribution, by incentive compatibility, we must have u k = U k (x s ), k = 1; 2, where x s is a distribution over fT; Bg fL; Rg, and again u cannot be individually rational for player 1.
The only way to possibly get an individually rational payo¤ vector for player 1 is thus a completely revealing solution. Such a solution is individually rational for player 2 i¤ L has probability 1 when type 1 is reported, and R has probability 1 when type 2 is reported. This can e.g. be seen from de…nition 2 and lemma 4: an expected payo¤ v is individually rational for player 2 in B(q) i¤ v max fq; 1 qg. This implies that player 1 gets at most 1, whatever his type is. But (1; 1) is not an individually rational vector payo¤ for player 1, since we have seen above that player 1 could guarantee 3 as a sum of expected payo¤s. Actually, according to (4) 
.1 Sender-receiver games
Let us assume that the informed player has no decision to make in the basic Bayesian game B(p), namely, that A 1 is a singleton (equivalently, the informed player has several actions but they have no impact on the payo¤s).
In this case, we can set A 2 = A and (A) can be interpreted as the set of mixed strategies of player 2 in B(p). In this particular framework, a solution consists of a signalling strategy : K ! (S) for the informed player and a strategy : S ! (A) of the uninformed player. Furthermore,
so that every feasible vector payo¤ is individually rational for player 1. For the uninformed player, we have that
and the individual rationality condition for this player reduces to
where p s is player 2's posterior probability distribution on K given s. It just says that given player 1's signal, player 2 chooses an action that maximizes his expected payo¤.
It thus appears that (S; ; ) de…nes a solution for B(p) if and only if ( ; ) is a Nash equilibrium of the following, noncooperative, sender-receiver game: player 1 is privately informed of his type k, then player 1 sends a signal s 2 S to player 2 and …nally, player 2 makes a decision a 2 A; player 1 gets U k (a) and player 2 gets V k (a). The uninformed player does not commit at all.
It is well-known (and easy to check) that every sender-receiver game has a nonrevealing equilibrium, namely, an equilibrium in which (s j k) does not depend on k. Hence, there always exists a nonrevealing solution in this case.
"Known own" payo¤s (private values)
Being fully informed in B(p), player 1 obviously knows his own payo¤. In this section, we further assume that player 2's payo¤ does not depend on player 1's type and is just described by a mapping V , independent of k 2 K. Let us de…ne
In this simple framework, a joint decision x 2 (A) induces an individually rational payo¤ for the uninformed player in B(p) if and only if V (x) v .
A completely revealing solution in B(p) is easily constructed. Let us take S K, (k j k) = 1 for every k 2 K (so that the posteriors correspond to the extreme points k of (K)) and
It is immediate that any (S; ; ) de…ned in this way satis…es incentive compatibility and individual rationality for player 2 (V (x k ) v for every k). To show that it satis…es individual rationality for player 1, recalling (4), let e (q) = k (q) k2K 2 (A 1 ) K be a strategy of player 1 in the game 1 (q) that guarantees him f 1 (q), let 2 (A 2 ) be a strategy of player 2 that guarantees him v in the one-shot game V and let y k (q) = k (q) . By construction, 
Uniform punishment strategy
Let us come back to the basic game B(p) and introduce a property of player 1's one-shot game payo¤s U k (:), k 2 K. Recall that for every k 2 K, u k is de…ned as the individually rational level of player 1 of type k, when k is complete information (see (8) ).
De…nition 8
2 (A 2 ) is a uniform punishment strategy (UPS) of the uninformed player i¤
The property means that the uninformed player can punish the informed one in the harshest way, namely, as if he knew the informed player's type, even without knowing it (see Forges and Salomon (2014) ). UPS is satis…ed in many games derived from economic applications: auctions, duopoly, contribution to a public good, etc. We will show that under UPS, there always exists a solution. 9 As observed before, if a payo¤ vector u = (u k ) k2K is individually rational for player 1 in B( ) (see de…nition 1), it is always true that u k u k 8k 2 K. If player 2 has a uniform strategy, the converse also holds, so that Lemma 9 If the uninformed player has a uniform punishment strategy, a payo¤ vector u = (u k ) k2K is individually rational for player 1 in
This characterization of player 1's individual rationality is familiar in principal-agent problems. Example 1 above shows that the existence of a uniform punishment strategy is crucial for the "if"part of the lemma.
Let u = (u k ) k2K be player 1's interim expected payo¤ at a solution (namely, (1)): u is individually rational for player 1 i¤ U k (x s ) u k for every k 2 K and for every s 2 S such that (s j k) > 0, namely, if, at every signal s, the joint decision x s is posterior individually rational for player 1. Individual rationality for player 1 can still be written equivalently by making use of the mapping f 1 de…ned in (4), which, under UPS, takes the simple form
Indeed, by (4) and (8), f 1 (q) P k2K q k u k . Conversely, player 1 can guarantee himself P k2K q k u k by playing an optimal strategy in the (one-shot, zero-sum) game with payo¤s U k ( ) when he is of type k, for every k.
We are now ready to state our main result (which holds without any restriction on player 2's payo¤s):
Proposition 10 Let B(p) be a two-person Bayesian game with a single informed player in which the uninformed player has a uniform punishment strategy. For every p 2 (K), B(p) has a feasible, posterior individually rational solution.
We show below that one way to establish proposition 10 is to see that it can be deduced from the existence of special Nash equilibria (namely, Aumann and Maschler (1968, 1995)'s joint plan equilibria) in the undiscounted in…nitely repeated version B 1 (p) of the basic Bayesian game (see Simon et al. (1995) ).
A proof of proposition 10 relying on Simon et al. (1995) Let B 1 (p) be the following in…nitely repeated game: at stage 0, player 1's type k is chosen once and for all according to p; at every stage t = 1; 2; :::, player 1 and player 2 choose simultaneously an action in A 1 and A 2 respectively; the actions chosen at every stage are revealed to both players stage after stage; the stage payo¤s are evaluated by U k (:) and V k (:) and only known to player 1. Payo¤s in B 1 (p) are evaluated through (Banach) limits of means (see Hart (1985) and Forges (1992) ).
In B 1 (p), player 1 can reveal his information through his actions. A simple signalling strategy for player 1 in B 1 (p) can thus be described as in section 2.1, with S = (A 1 ) t for some stage t. According to Stearns (1968, 1995 ) (see also Forges (1992) ) a joint plan equilibrium in B 1 (p) consists of a signalling strategy for player 1 and for every signal s, of a nonrevealing equilibrium of B 1 (p s ) to be played from stage t + 1 on, given the posterior probability distribution p s that is achieved through signalling. The nonrevealing equilibrium of B 1 (p s ) is described by a correlated strategy 10 x s (s) 2 (A) which induces individually rational payo¤s for both players in B 1 (p s ).
To formally de…ne individual rationality in B 1 (q), q 2 (K), let 1;N R (q) (resp., 2;N R (q)) be the one-shot expected game based on player 1 (resp., 2)'s payo¤ and let f N R (q) (resp., g N R (q)) be the value of 1;N R (q) (resp.,
In both f N R and g N R , it is understood that player 1 does not make use of his information, i.e., chooses his strategy independently of his type. Let p be any prior in the interior of (K); following Blackwell (1956) and Maschler (1968, 1995) , a vector payo¤ u = (u k ) k2K is individually rational for player 1 in B 1 (p) if and only if 8q 2 (K) q u f N R (q) (13) where f N R is de…ned by (11) . In other words, the latter condition is necessary and su¢ cient for player 2 to have a strategy 1 in B 1 (p) which guarantees that player 1's payo¤ in B 1 (p) does not exceed u k when his type is k, whatever the type k is.
Similarly, a payo¤ v is individually rational for player 2 in B 1 (p) if and
where vexg N R is the convexi…cation of g, i.e., the largest convex mapping that is below g N R over the simplex. In other words, (14) is necessary and su¢ cient for player 1 to have a (type dependent) strategy 1 in 1 (p) which guarantees that player 2's payo¤ in B 1 (p) does not exceed v.
Using the previous notions of individual rationality, we can give a fully precise de…nition: (S; ; ) is a joint plan equilibrium in B 1 (p) i¤ (S; ; ) satis…es the incentive compatibility conditions i) and ii) of section 2.1, with
Player 1's interim expected payo¤ (u k ) k2K , which can be de…ned as in (1), namely, by u k = U k (x s ) for every k, s such that (s j k) > 0, is individually rational in the sense of (13). Player 2's conditional expected payo¤ given s, namely,
, where p s is the posterior probability distribution over K at s (computed from p and ), is individually rational in B 1 (p s ), in the sense of (14) .
According to Simon et al. (1995) , for every p, there exists a joint plan equilibrium (S; ; ) in the in…nitely repeated game B 1 (p), which, by de…-nition, is feasible (in particular, incentive compatible) in the one-shot game B(p). To complete the proof of the proposition, we still have to check that (S; ; ) is individually rational for both players in B(p).
For player 2, the result is immediate. By lemma 4, individidual rationality for player 2 in B(p) can be formulated in terms of the mapping g 1 (see (9)). By the de…nitions of g 1 and g N R , g 1 g N R and g 1 is convex. Hence, for player 2, individidual rationality in B 1 (p s ) implies individidual rationality in B(p s ), at every s.
Let us show that, thanks to UPS, (S; ; ) is also individually rational for player 1 in B(p). To see this, let be a uniform strategy of player 2; by the de…nition of f N R (namely, (11)),
This implies that under UPS, cavf N R (q) P k2K q k u k , where cavf N R is the concavi…cation of f N R , i.e., the smallest concave mapping that is above f N R over the simplex. On the other hand, recalling that k denotes the kth extreme point of (K),
Hence, under UPS,
and, using (13), u = (u k ) k2K is individually rational for player 1 in
From lemma 9, under UPS, individual rationality for player 1 in the one-shot game B(p) reduces to the same condition.
The previous proof shows that when UPS holds, cavf N R is linear. 11 The latter property greatly simpli…es the study of in…nitely repeated games with lack of information on one side since it allows to dispense with Blackwell's approachability theorem in the de…nition of individual rationality for the informed player. However, another look at example 1 shows that the linearity of cavf N R is weaker than UPS and does not guarantee the existence of a solution in B(p).
Example 1 (continued):
Recall that, in this example,
Given player 2's payo¤s, there is no cooperative solution in B(p), 0 < p < 1. One computes that
11 More precisely, recalling the de…nition of the concave mapping f 1 (i.e., (4)) and lemma 9, under UPS,
Hence, cavf N R (p) = 1 for every p. In particular, cavf N R is linear, even if UPS is not satis…ed. For every p, B 1 (p) has a completely revealing equilibrium achieving the vector payo¤ (1; 1) for player 1. This example illustrates that when UPS does not hold, individual rationality for player 1 is weaker in B 1 ( ) than in B( ).
In the next example, UPS is veri…ed and a cooperative solution exists. However, for some values of the prior probability distribution over states, there does not exist any nonrevealing solution and there does not exist any completely revealing solution either. In particular, the revelation principle does not hold in our framework. In the partially revealing constructed solution, the informed player of type k just gets his individually rational level u k .
Player 1's payo¤ matrices are:
We check that u 1 = u 2 = 3 and that L and R are uniform punishment strategies of player 2. Player 2's payo¤s are exactly as in Forges (1990) ; in particular, they depend on player 1's type but they do not depend on player 1's action:
F L L C R F R T 10 9 7 4 0 B 10 9 7 4 0
F L L C R F R T 0 4 7 9 10 B 0 4 7 9 10
Let us denote as p 2 [0; 1] the probability that k = 1. It is immediate that F R is optimal for 0 p 1 5 , R is optimal for , C is optimal for
, L is optimal for . Let us …rst show that there is no nonrevealing solution. A nonrevealing solution consists of x 2 (A) such that U 1 (x) 3, U 2 (x) 3 and
The latter condition implies that player 2 must take the action C, namely that x = 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 for some 0 1
and
so that there is indeed no nonrevealing solution.
Let us show next that there is no completely revealing solution at p = . A completely revealing solution is described by x k 2 (A), k = 1; 2, x k being interpreted as the joint decision when player 1 reports type k. Individual rationality for player 2 means that V 1 (x 1 ) g 1 (1), i.e., player 2 chooses F L when he gets signal 1 and similarly, V 2 (x 2 ) g 1 (0), i.e., player 2 chooses F R when he gets signal 2. and U 2 (x 2 ) = 4 with . Incentive compatibility for player 1 means that . Let player 1 send signals r and s so as to reach the posteriors p r = 1 4 and p s = . In order to satisfy player 2's individual rationality condition, we must have that x r gives probability 1 to R and that x s gives probability 1 to L. Incentive compatibility is trivially satis…ed since player 1 gets 3 no matter what. The payo¤s at this partially revealing solution are (3; 3) for player 1 (i.e., just his individual rationality level) and 31 4 for player 2. To complete the analysis, f N R (p) = 4 max fp; 1 pg if 1 4 p 3 4 = 3 otherwise so that cavf N R (p) = 3 for every p.
As another reference, the one-shot (noncooperative) Bayesian game has a Nash equilibrium in which player 1 chooses T when k = 1 and B when k = 2, while player 2 chooses C, which gives the payo¤s (4; 4) to player 1 and 7 to player 2. These payo¤s can be achieved by a centralized mechanism à la Myerson (1991), i.e., they are in M B( can also fail when UPS is not satis…ed. This is illustrated in section 3.3: in example 1 (continued), B 1 (p) has a completely revealing equilibrium which is obviously individually rational for player 1 in B 1 (p) (namely, satis…es (13)) but is not interim individually rational for player 1 in B(p), in spite of the fact that player 2's approachability strategy is straightforward, cavf N R being linear.
Solutions when both players are privately informed
Let us extend the basic Bayesian game so that both player 1 and player 2 have private information. Let K and L be …nite sets. At a virtual initial stage of the game, player 1's type k is chosen in K according to p and, independently, player 2's type`is chosen in L according to q. Only player 1 (resp., 2) is informed of k (resp.,`). Unless speci…ed otherwise, we assume that p k > 0 and that q`> 0 for every k 2 K,`2 L.
Player 1 and player 2 choose simultaneously an action in …nite sets A 1 and A 2 respectively. If the pair of actions a 2 A = A 1 A 2 is chosen, they get the respective payo¤s U k (a) and V`(a). Each player thus knows his own payo¤ (according to another terminology, "values are private"). We refer to this game as B(p; q).
We will also assume that UPS holds for both players. Given the private values assumption, we can still de…ne player 1's type k individually rational level by u k , exactly as in (8) , for every k 2 K, and we can de…ne player 2's type`individually rational level in the same way, by v`, for every`2 L.
Let S and T be sets of signals and let : S T ! (A). As in section 2.3, we can introduce a noncooperative game G(p; q; S; T; ) to be played as follows:
-Player 1's type k is chosen in K according to p, player 2's type`is chosen in L according to q, only player 1 (resp., 2) is informed of k (resp.,`).
-Player 1 sends a signal s 2 S to player 2, and simultaneously, player 2 sends a signal t 2 T to player 1.
-The correlated strategy (s; t) = x st 2 (A) is proposed to both players.
and asks them whether they accept x or not; if they both accept, x is implemented; otherwise, they choose their actions themselves. By proceeding in the same way as to establish the revelation principle, it is a Nash equilibrium for both players to reveal their type and to accept the outcome proposed by the mediator. 12 We thus have, for player 1,
x (x j k;`)x E (e x j k;`)
Then, recalling that U k is linear, the left hand side of (16) is P`2 L q`U k (x k`) . By using that max is convex, and then again that U k is linear, the right hand side is larger than P`2 L q`max U k ( P x (x j k 0 ;`)x); u k , hence (16) implies (15) . One can proceed similarly for player 2.
Equipped with the previous simple characterization of C [B(p; q)], we are going to check whether an analog of corollary 11 holds in the current model. Koren (1992) already proposed a characterization like lemma 12 for the undiscounted in…nitely repeated version of B(p; q), which we denote as B 1 (p; q) and which can be de…ned in the same way as B 1 (p). Assuming private values but not UPS, Koren (1992) showed that every Nash equilibrium of B 1 (p; q) is payo¤ equivalent to a completely revealing Nash equilibrium, so that it can in particular be achieved as a joint plan equilibrium.
Let N [B 1 (p; q)] be the set of all interim expected Nash equilibrium payo¤s of B 1 (p; q). As corollary 11, the previous result can be interpreted as a folk theorem. However, there is an important di¤erence with the case of a single informed player: N [B 1 (p; q)] -and thus also C [B(p; q)] -can be empty. Koren (1992) provides a counter-example, which turns out to satisfy UPS (see Forges and Salomon (2014) for further illustration).
Observe that the model in proposition 13 is both more general and more restrictive than the one of corollary 11. In proposition 13, there is lack of information on both sides but values are private, which was not necessarily true (for player 2) above, except in section 3.2.2. The next example illustrates that even if player 1 is the only one to have private information and player 2 knows his own payo¤ (as in section 3.2.2) the partial folk theorem N [B 1 (p; q)] M [B(p; q)] is not true without UPS. 14 
Example 3
Let jA 1 j = jA 2 j = 2 and the utility functions be described by The assumption of uniform punishments is clearly not satis…ed: player 2 must play right in order to hold player 1 of type 1 at his value level u 1 = 0 and must play left to hold him at u 2 = 0. Recalling (11), the value of player 1's expected one-shot game is
